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Can people be harmed after they are gone? If so, by 
what means can we protect their posthumous interests? Do 
the dead have legal rights? These sequential questions are 
not only philosophical puzzles, but are also a problem for 
lawmakers and judges in most jurisdictions. This article 
approaches a legal problem that crosses the boundary of life 
and death, namely how we legally protect dead people, 
especially under the civil law system. Historically, the law is 
set up to deal with people from the cradle to the grave. 
Following the old notion that “the dead do not hear,” the life 
of the dead is placed in the memory of the living but 
disappears from the scope of legal concern.1 Once a human 
being becomes a corpse, on some measures, it may be 
viewed as something like “a piece of furniture.”2 But the 
corpse is more than a utilitarian object, it is an ambiguous 
entity. Consider, for instance, the disposal of the deceased’s 
body against the local consuetude,3 harvesting organs 
                                                
	
	
1 In an early U.S. case, for example, the court held that “libel or slander 
upon the memory of a deceased person which makes no direct reflection 
upon his relatives gives them no cause of action for defamation.” See 
Rose v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 31 N.E. 2d 182, 182-83 (N.Y. 1940). 
2 Kieron McEvoy & Heather Conway, The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of 
the Past, 31 J.L. & SOC'Y 539, 540 n.4 (2004). 
3 For the most recent example, international community urges that 
bodies of the dead must be respected soon after the tragedy of Malaysia 
Airlines flight MH17 crashed in 2014. Bodies of the dead must be respected: 
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without prior consent from the deceased, or disclosing of 
private information (e.g. medical records). Such examples 
show how people can be harmed after death. For centuries, 
fundamental legal categories such as personality, rights, and 
interests focused on the natural person who is alive. Thus, 
traditional civil law has the character of being secular. When 
life no longer exists, where should the legal interests lie? 
The concept of posthumous harm refers to the harm 
caused after the victim has died.4 It is necessary to make a 
distinction between harm caused by death and harm after death, 
which is often confused in the literature on posthumous 
harm. In this article, the phrase “posthumous harm” will be 
used to collectively refer to various harms to the interests of 
the deceased. The purpose of this article is to clarify the 
question of what legal logic should be followed in post-
mortem relief. This is inevitably a grey zone in legal theory. 
It resembles a black box with one end representing the 
interests of the deceased and the other end representing the 
interests of the living. Unfortunately, very few have asked 
what civil law mechanism can connect the two together.  
About 9.72 million people passed away in China in 
2013,5 which is approximately equivalent to Sweden’s total 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
Abbott, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 20, 2014), 
http://www.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/bodies-of-dead-
must-be-respected-abbott-20140720-3c8o9.html. 
4 DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 15 (Margaret Brazier & Graeme Laurie, eds. 2008). 
5 CHINESE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm (last visited Sept. 
17, 2015).  
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population.6 Unfortunately, few Chinese legal scholars have 
queried whether all or some of the posthumous interests 
should be advanced or protected as legal rights. In practice, 
ancestral graves are eradicated for the purpose of real estate 
development without the consent of the grave owners,7 or 
the organs of the deceased are donated against the ante-
mortem’s will.8 All of these acts are made in the name of 
safeguarding the public interest. However, by simply 
soliciting the abstract concept of public interest, the juridical 
foundation of posthumous harm cannot be established 
convincingly.9 
In Chinese culture, on the one hand, respecting the 
deceased is a deeply rooted moral claim, and thus, 
posthumous interests should be protected. On the other 
hand, being accustomed to abiding by the civil law principle 
that only the living have legal status, many Chinese judges 
find themselves at an impasse. According to my case study 
on Chinese Supreme Court’s decisions, judicial attitudes 
                                                
	
	
6 THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/sw.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2015). 
7 In the campaign labeled as ‘flatten graves to return farmland,’ two 
million tombs in central Henan province have been destroyed. See Jane 
Macartney, Anger as two million graves are torn up to make room for farms, 
LONDON TIMES (Nov. 22, 2012), at 40. 
8 See Xiao Hang (晓航), jin ping mei si qiu qiguan juanxian jiao ting hou 
qiguan bugou yong zha ban (今评媒：死囚器官捐献叫停后器官不够用咋
办?) [This rating media: death-stop organ after organ donation is not 
enough to do?] (Dec. 4, 2014), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/zg/jpm/2014-
12-04/1707445.html. There was a rumor of unauthorized use of organs 
from deceased prisoners who were convicted of the death penalty. 
9 See Xi Xiaoming, QINQUAN ZEREN FA TIAOWEN LIJIE YU SHIYONG 
[Understanding and Application of Tort Liability Law] 27 (People’s 
Court Press 2010). 
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toward posthumous harm nowadays are blurred. On this 
account, there are many theoretical problems regarding the 
compensation for death, mental health damages of the next 
of kin, and litigation disputes related to tombs. Therefore, 
exploring the problem of posthumous harm is vital to the 
drafting of the Chinese Civil Code. 
The article proceeds as follows. Part I starts with 
existing debates over posthumous harm as the theoretical 
background, and the article tries to justify the concept of 
posthumous harm.  
Part II focuses on the legal practice in China. As the 
textual analysis shows, the standpoint adopted for the 
jurisdiction of posthumous harm in China is inconsistent. 
Uncertainty of law reveals a methodology deadlock: since 
the modern times, domains of philosophy of law, such as 
personality and rights or rights and interests, center around 
the natural living person, thus constituting the legal basis 
under traditional civil law. However, the intrusion of the 
concept of the deceased has caused a rupture in the “wall of 
uncertainty” constructed by the Chinese Civil Code. 
Part III then tries to unlock the legal puzzle of 
posthumous harm under the civil law system. After the 
natural person dies, what are the interests to be protected by 
civil law? I argue that posthumous interests can be 
categorized into extended interests, converted interests, and 
interests of the body. Meanwhile, methodology of legal 
fiction, which treats these different concepts as equivalent, 
provides a quite reasonable explanation of the civil law 
mechanism that crosses the boundary of life and death. At 
least, it prevents face-to-face conflicts with the traditional 
civil law with worldliness features and makes the rigid law 
more flexible by resorting to circuitous strategy.  
Part IV attempts to apply the preliminary findings to 
the development of Chinese law. I suggest that the 
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posthumous interests should be protected as legal interests, 
rather than legal rights. This approach does not only satisfy 
the systemic requirements of modern civil law, but also 
preserves the flexibility of legal application. According to the 
interest-based model, legal protection can only be taken 
when the defendant acts with malice or with gross 
negligence when posthumous interests are at stake. It 
actually implies the use of common sense: the law protects 
the greater interest better—namely, the deceased person is 
not and should not be treated on the same level as the living 
one. 
Part V offers a brief conclusion. I insist that 
posthumous harm is not as simple as failing to hold a decent 
funeral. In modern society, respecting the deceased is no 
longer a vague moral claim, but a legal norm that needs to 
be obeyed by the living. 
 
I. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS OF POSTHUMOUS HARM 
 
As the master of utilitarianism, the English 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham of the 19th century stuck to the 
principle of utility well after his death. His body is still 
preserved at the Museum of London.10 Imagine if somebody 
stole Bentham’s body. It would be held by the laws of 
various countries that this act violates the property right of 
the museum (Bentham made an explicit statement to donate 
his body to the museum11). If this person randomly disposed 
                                                
	
	
10 In Bentham’s own words, preserving his body is “oral, political, 
honorific, dehornorific, money-saving, money getting, commemorative, 
genealogical, architectural, theatrical, and phrenological.” See Dorothy 
Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues for 
Research after Life, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 261 (1998). 
11 Bentham requested that his body be preserved in this way in his will 
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the body, took away the bones of Bentham’s fingers to 
damage the integrity of the body, or disclosed a secret about 
Bentham by using the body, would this be an infringement 
of Bentham's rights? A philosophical problem ensues: Is 
there any posthumous harm? This fundamental question has 
been addressed from varied metaphysical perspectives. 
The concept of posthumous harm is still controversial. 
The focus of the dispute is the “experience problem,” 
namely, “how can one be harmed when one does not know 
or experience the evil of harm?”12 The posthumous retention 
of interests has engendered vigorous debate among 
philosophers. Two scholars in particular, Joel Feinberg and 
Ernest Partridge, have academically presented this concept.13 
They both arrive at the conclusion that the wishes and 
commitments of the dead should be respected, albeit via 
different routes.14 However, Partridge claims that a person, 
alive or dead, cannot be harmed if he is unaware of the 
harm.15 
Violation is closely related to the acknowledgement of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
made shortly before his death on June 6, 1832: “My body I give to my 
dear friend Doctor Southwood Smith to be disposed of in a manner 
hereinafter mentioned, and I direct . . . he will take my body under his 
charge and take the requisite and appropriate measures for the disposal 
and preservation of the several parts of my bodily frame in the manner 
expressed in the paper annexed to this my will and at the top of which I 
have written Auto Icon.” AUTO-ICON, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/Bentham-
Project/who/autoicon (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
12 See SPERLING, supra note 4, at 15. 
13 See generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 181-82 (Cornell Univ. Press, Vol. 1 1984) (Discussing 
four categories of causally necessary conditions). 
14 Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous 
Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 935-36 (1997).  
15 Joan C. Callahan, On Harming the Dead, 97 ETHICS 341, 343-46 (1987).  
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the existence of interests. In legal practice, it is very difficult 
for judges to answer the issue of the “experience problem.”16 
For example, in the United States, “courts must address 
whether the post-mortem pregnant woman has interests that 
can be infringed upon by surviving parties or the state.”17 
Similarly, Chinese courts often have to determine whether 
the dead retain interests, especially on Tomb-Sweeping Day, 
which is a national festival for the Chinese people to visit 
ancestral graves.18 Presently, this important but unusual 
question has not been fully researched by the mainstream 
legal scholars in China. 
To establish the concept of posthumous harm, as 
implied earlier, one has to explore the “experience problem” 
raised by many skeptical enquirers.19 In my opinion, the 
“experience problem” might be subdivided into two 
questions: First, if he or she cannot perceive the fact of 
violation, will his or her interests be violated? Second, whose 
posthumous harm is actually violated? The former could be 
labeled as the “Puzzle of Object,” while the latter is the 
“Puzzle of Subject.”  
 
 
                                                
	
	
16 See SPERLING, supra note 4, at 15. 
17 Alexis Gregorian, Post-mortem Pregnancy: A Proposed Methodology for the 
Resolution of Conflicts Over Whether a Brain Dead Pregnant Woman Should 
Be Maintained on Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 401, 404 
(2010) (available at 
http://laweconommons.luc.edu/annals/vol19/iss2/6). 
18 See Xiao Zecheng, Mudi Shang De Xianfa Quanli [Constitutional Rights 
in Graves], 7 FA XUE [Law Science] 70, 71-72 (2011).  
19 Frederik Kaufman, Comments on Death, Posthumous Harm and Bioethics, 
40.9 J. MED. ETHICS 639, 639-40 (2014) (available at 
jme.bmj.com/content/early/2013/12/17/medethics-2013-101755.full). 
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A. PUZZLE OF OBJECT: CAN INTERESTS EXIST INDEPENDENT 
OF THE MENTAL STATE OF HUMAN BEINGS? 
 
In history, there are two ancient views of life and 
death by Aristotle and Epicurus. Aristotle believed that even 
the deceased have good and evil (a living person will 
encounter good and evil, but he or she has no sense of it at 
all).20 Aristotelians argue that death is the most terrible of all 
evils.21 Therefore, “not only is death not a harm to the 
person who dies, but also that posthumous harm is 
impossible and persons cannot be wronged after their 
deaths.”22 According to the philosophy of Epicurus, death 
has nothing to do with us.23 When a person is alive, he is not 
dead, and so his death has not harmed him; if a person is 
dead, he does not exist, and so no harm can befall him.24 In a 
nutshell, the Epicurean view goes against the Aristotelian 
view on harm caused by death but holds a similar opinion 
about rejecting the concept of harm after death.25 The 
opposing theories of the two philosophers have been the 
source of academic disputes for thousands of years.26 
                                                
	
	
20 See generally Marianna W. Lewis, Exploring Paradox: Toward a More 
Comprehensive Guide, 25.4 AM. MGMT. REV. 760, 762 (2000).  
21 See generally Robert C. Solomon, Is There Happiness After Death?, 51 
PHIL. 189, 189-93 (1976); see also, Kurt Pritzl, Aristotle and Happiness After 
Death: Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11, 78 CLASSICAL PHIL. 101, 101-11 (1983). 
22 Daniel Sperling, Death, Posthumous Harm and Bioethics, 30 J. APPLIED 
PHIL. 285, 285 (2013).  
23 James Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics, 56 THE PHIL. Q. 
294, 294-97 (2004).  
24James Stacey Taylor, The Myth of Posthumous Harm, 42 AM. PHIL. Q. 311, 
311-12 (2005). 
25 Maria Bitsori & Emmanouil Galanakis, Epicurus’ Death, 22 WORLD J. 
UROL. 466, 466-69 (2004). 
26 Don Marquis, Harming the Dead, 96 ETHICS 159, 159-61 (1985).  
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Crucially, both Aristotelian and Epicurean theories cannot 
undermine the plausibility of posthumous harm from the 
legal perspective. 
Can people be harmed regardless of the 
consciousness of man?27 Although the philosophical 
disputes persist to the present day, the attitude towards 
unperceived interests in legal world is different. My sense is 
that positive law has taken an explicit standpoint on this: 
interests exist regardless of the consciousness of man, and 
this belief has pervaded a multitude of civil law. For 
instance, a comatose person or a recluse who runs away 
from society and spends his life in a deserted land still 
enjoys the interests of personality though he remains 
incommunicado with the rest of society. Rethinking these 
statutory rules can help us solve the “puzzle of 
objectivity.”28 Briefly but clearly, I maintain that this puzzle 
may be interpreted in three analytical steps. 
First of all, unlike its meaning in natural science, legal 
objectivity implies public consensus. Dissimilarly, the 
objectiveness in natural science can be proved by repeatable 
experiments. In the domain of law, if a legal rule is 
supported by sufficient reasons, which have been clearly 
voiced and publicly commented upon, then the rule has 
objectiveness. As Postema argues, legal objectivity “puts the 
notion of consensus, or agreement based on public 
argument, at the center of the notion of the objectivity.”29 
Hence, the objectiveness in the domain of law is built upon 
                                                
	
	
27 This is the influence of the opinions of Aristotle and Epicurus on 
interest theory of the later generation. See generally James Stacey Taylor, 
supra note 24, at 311-20 (discussing the myth of posthumous harm). 
28 See SPERLING, supra note 4, at 25-34. 
29 GERALD J. POSTEMA, OBJECTIVITY FIT FOR LAW, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW 
AND MORALS 120 (Brian Leiter, ed. 2001). 
2015 WHERE LAW MEETS CULTURE 149 
the concept of publicity, which gives it a social dimension. In 
other words, legal objectivity has nothing to do with a single 
person’s consciousness or feeling.30 
Next, the objectivity of interests of the deceased is 
perceived through public value judgment. The question of 
posthumous harm is the question of whether anything that 
happens after your death can advance or set back your 
welfare.31 Thus, justification for posthumous is closely 
bound with the nature of welfare. As Amartya Sen pointed 
out, welfare is, after all, a problem of value judgment.32 
Happiness and desire may have their meanings, but they are 
not sufficient to reflect the values of welfare.33 As long as the 
assessment of interests is independent of the awareness of 
man, the interests of the deceased can be protected in 
accordance with the domain of value judgment. As stated by 
ethical intuitionism of Moore, although we know what 
goodness is, we cannot prove it.34 Similarly, we may be 
unable to prove what the interests of the deceased are, but 
we at least know what the interests of the decedent may be 
by drawing on the view of public values shared within a 
specific field. 
Finally, the legitimacy of the interests of the deceased 
                                                
	
	
30 Posner holds that the best model for legal objectivity is empirical 
science because legal objectivity could not be meaningfully found on 
practical or legal reason. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF 
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 117 (Harv. Univ. Press 1999). If Posner’s 
viewpoint is valid, legal objectivity can even be measurable. 
31 SIMON KELLER, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LIFE AND DEATH 182 
(Steven Luper, ed. 2013). 
32 AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 46 (John M. Letiche, ed. 
1987).   
33 Id. at 46. 
34 Aulis Aarnio & Alexsander Peczenik, On Values: Universal or Relative?, 
9 RATIO JURIS 322, 322 (1996).  
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is acknowledged by the view of public value. Why do we 
have to protect the interests of the deceased? In my opinion, 
there are generally two perspectives on this issue, i.e. 
functionalism and moralism. In the former, respecting and 
protecting the deceased is the self-regarding need of the 
living, which is an incentive for the living. In the latter, 
protecting the deceased is to satisfy the self-interests of the 
deceased, which is an ethical and moral requirement.35 
Although the two postulate different theoretical routes, they 
arrive at similar outcomes—that is, acknowledging the 
legitimacy of the interests of the deceased.36 
If interests are considered as welfare with objective 
existence, one’s interests can still be violated regardless of 
his or her perception of the violation. Thus, we cannot deny 
the objective existence of the interests of the deceased simply 
because the deceased has no perception. 
 
B. PUZZLE OF SUBJECT: TO WHOM THE POSTHUMOUS HARM 
IS BROUGHT? 
 
The comatose person is, after all, the living rather 
than the dead, and thus we need to further explore why the 
interests still have objectiveness when they die. That is, how 
can the interests be separated from the physical existence? 
To answer this question, we have to historically clarify such 
misleading notions as personality, personality rights, and 
personality interests. 
                                                
	
	
35 Ernest Partridge, Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect, 91 
ETHICS 243, 243 (1981). For more details, see Joan C. Callahan, supra note 
15, at 341-42.  
36 See JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 45-68 
(Prin. Univ. Press 1980).  
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The concept of personality originates in persona in 
Latin, with the original meaning being masks worn on 
stage.37 The school of Stoics uses the word persona to refer to 
the independent entities that have reason.38 In Roman law, 
persona refers to the citizens with the right of freedom.39 
Thus, personality is interpreted as the subject qualification of 
rights and obligations. German Civil Law in 1896 used the 
concept of personality in Roman law with the term legal 
capacity replacing the concept of personality.40 The notion of 
legal capacity was transplanted to China's civil law in the 
late Qing Dynasty, and this term has been used even to the 
present day.41 
As a typically continental European legal term, the 
concept of “personality rights” is generally used to denote 
                                                
	
	
37 CARLOS ALBERTO DA MOTA PINTO, TEORIA GERAL DO DIREITO CIVIL [The 
General Theory of Civil Law] 41 (Macau Legal Translation Office 1999).  
38 For Stoics, everyone has a universal persona (communis), insofar as 
each person is a human being and not a brute. Meanwhile, everyone has 
a particular persona (singulis), which distinguishes each other in terms of 
physical prowess, personal appearance, and character. M. ANDREW 
HOLOWCHAK, THE STOICS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 206 (Continuum 
Int’l Publ’g Grp. 2007). 
39 The notion of persona firstly appeared through the Institutes of Gaius in 
the 2nd century AD, and later inspired the Institutiones of Justinian’s 
Corpus Iuris Civilis in the 6th century AD. PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN 
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 7 (Gert Brüggemeier, Aurelia Colombi, & Partick 
O’Callaghan, 2010). 
40 István Hoffman & György Könczei, Legal Regulating to the Passive and 
Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities 
in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the 
Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 143, 152 (2010). 
41 William C. Jones, Some Questions Regarding the Significance of the General 
Provisions of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
309, 322 (1987). 
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the bundle of rights aiming at the protection of the integrity 
and inviolability of individuals.42 To my knowledge, the 
concept of personality rights was created much later than 
personality. Roman law contained both positive and 
negative definitions of the right of personality that was 
divided into honor right and reputation right.43 However, a 
uniform concept of personality right did not form until the 
Code Napoleon.44 The German Civil Code thereafter wrote 
the fundamental provision of personality rights under 
Article 823, which refers to the protection of the life, body, 
and health of individuals.45 In 1986, Chinese law enacted 
General Principles of the Civil Law and used the term 
“personal rights” (Ren Shen Quan) to encompass rights of 
life, health, personal name, portrait, reputation, honor, and 
marriage by choice.46  
The origin of the notion of “personality interests” is 
hard to trace because it is an open-textured concept. But 
                                                
	
	
42 In the Anglo-American context, privacy and defamation are the closest 
equivalent of the Continental category of “personality rights.” See 
Giorgio Resta, The New Frontiers of Personality Rights and the Problem of 
Commodification: European and Comparative Perspectives, 26 TUL. EUR. & 
CIV. L.F. 33, 34 n.2 (2011). 
43 See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Story in the Law of 
Artists, Authors, and Creators., 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 556 (1940); see also 
Adolf Dietz. The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil Law 
Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 200 (1995). 
44 French scholar Hugues Doneau established the modern theory of 
personality rights in 1828. See Xu Guodong, Renge Quan Zhidu Lishi Yange 
Kao [Historical Evolution of the System of Interests of Personality], 1 
LAW AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 5 n.15-16 (2008). 
45 See generally Harry D. Krause, The Right to Privacy in Germany—Pointers 
for American Legislation? 1965 DUKE L.J. 481 (1965). 
46 See Zhong Hua Renmin Gong He Guo Min Fa Tong Ze (China), translated 
in General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
arts. 98-105 (1987).   
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there is one thing we can be certain about: the concept of 
interests of personality was initially used by China's scholars 
in civil law to represent the attempt of seeking a balance 
between various objects of legal relations, including things, 
behavior, and intellectual achievement.47 Because the word 
“interests” is flexible, the notion of “personality interests” 
means all kinds of inviolability of individuals in China’s 
legal sense.48 
After clarifying the fundamental notions of 
personality, personality rights, and personality interest, we 
find that many prevailing views are misleading. On the one 
hand, personality is separated from personality rights. 
Personality rights were not acknowledged until the 19th 
century when self-interest and its motivation were accepted. 
The person with a personality does not necessarily have 
personality rights. For instance, a legal person enjoys 
corporate personality but does not enjoy personality rights. 
On the other hand, personality is separated from personality 
interests.49 Nowadays, some kinds of personality interests 
such as likeness, privacy, name, and credit have profitable 
recognition value and hence, “assume some of the attributes 
                                                
	
	
47 Cao Xianfeng, Lun Deguo Minfa Zhong De Ren, Renge, Rengequan: 
Jianlun Woguo Min Fa Dian De Ying Ran Taidu [Research on Person, 
Personality and Right of Personality in the Civil Law in Germany: Research on 
Theoretical Position about China's Code of Civil Law], 12 L. AND SOC. DEV. 
53-65 (2006). 
48 Ma Jun-Ju, Cong Renge Liyi Dao Renge Yaosu: Renge Quan Falü Guanxi 
Keti Zhi Queding [From Personality Interest to the Element of 
Personality—Definition to the Objects of the Personality Right Legal 
Relationship], 10 HEBEI L. SCI. 43, 43-49 (2006). 
49 In a classic article, Pound defined personality interests as “the 
individual physical and spiritual existence.” In my opinion, this 
definition confused personality interests with personality. See Roscoe 
Pound, Interests of Personality., 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 349 (1915). 
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of a marketable commodity.”50 Accordingly, it is possible 
that personality interests might break away from the specific 
entity in the case of commercial use of personality interests.  
Such findings help us understand the Puzzle of 
Subjectivity of posthumous harm.51 Given that interests can 
be separated from personality, the disappearance of 
personality does not necessarily mean the disappearance of 
interests. During one's life, personality and interest are 
united as a whole. Once a human being passes away, the 
personality no longer exists, but interests may possibly 
survive. The fundamental reason for this is that personality 
interests of the deceased are deeply embedded in human 
dignity. Human dignity exists because of humanity, rather 
than the types and status of the individuals. Of course, the 
formation of this point of view takes some time. Several days 
before the implementation of German Civil Law, in the 
aftermath of the Bismarck Photograph Case of 1899, the 
Supreme Court circumvented the problem of personality 
interests of the deceased and ruled the returning of the 
photograph by the accused because of improper profit.52 
This act was criticized as an ostrich policy.53 Seventy years 
later, the Mephisto case finally acknowledged the protection 
of the interests of personality of the deceased in the form of 
                                                
	
	
50 Personality Rights in European Tort Law, supra note 39, at 39. 
51 Michael Da Silva, On Barbara Baum Levenbook’s “Harming Someone after 
His Death”, 125 ETHICS 1160, 1160 (2015).  
52 Basil S. Markesinis & Hannes Unberath, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS A 
COMPARATIVE TREATISE 76 (Dr. Walter Odersky et al. eds., 4th ed. 2002). 
53 See J. ALDEN NICHOLS, GERMANY AFTER BISMARCK THE CAPRIVI ERA 
1890-1894 (Harvard University Press, 1958); see also Robert Hariman & 
John Louis Lucaites, Performing Civic Identity: The Iconic Photograph of the 
Flag Raising on Iwo Jima, 88 Q. J. SPEECH 363, 363-92 (2002).   
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legal precedent.54 According to the views of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the right of claiming to respect the 
general rights of man should be protected any way.55 This 
had an impact on the civil law: the posthumous interests of a 
man should be protected in a spiritual aspect.56 In other 
words, the protection of the interests of the deceased cannot 
be perceived by the deceased, but it is an act of protecting 
human dignity. 
 
II. CASE STUDY OF POSTHUMOUS HARM IN CHINA 
 
Borrowing from the methodology of comparative law 
analysis, I approach the case study of posthumous harm in 
China from two directions, namely “operative rules” and 
“legal formants.”57 The operative rules summarize the actual 
judicial decision of posthumous harm in China, while the 
legal formants comprehensively explain the legal basis and 




                                                
	
	
54 Stephen R. McAllister, Would Other Countries Protect the Phelpses’ 
Funeral Picketing? 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. 409, 411 (2010); Marc Chase 
McAllister, Human Dignity and Individual Liberty in Germany and the 
United States as Examined Through Each Country’s Leading Abortion Cases, 
11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 491, 495 (2004). 
55 Hannes Rösler, Dignitarian Posthumous Personality Rights – An Analysis 
of U.S. and German Constitutional and Tort Law, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 153, 
155 (2008). 
56 DIETER SCHWAB, GENERAL THEORY TO CIVIL LAW 93 (2006). 
57 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative 
Law (2nd installment) 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343, 358 (1991); see also Mauro 
Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private 
Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 345 (1997). 
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A. OPERATIVE RULES 
 
Turning to the operative rules of posthumous harm, I 
will discuss a judicial case in China. According to local 
customs, deceased persons should be buried at the right time 
or else it will bring bad luck to the dead’s family. 
Unfortunately, due to the sudden mechanical breakdown, 
the funeral parlor delayed “the right time” of interment. This 
case sparked a controversy of whether the defendant 
infringed upon the interests of the deceased. The court 
decided that “the dignity of human personality cannot be 
separated from the subjects having subjective consciousness. 
The subjects without subjective consciousness do not have 
the dignity of human personality.”58 However, in another 
similar case, the court issued an opposite ruling. When a 
retired teacher committed suicide by jumping from a high 
building, the school authorities had the body cremated 
without informing the deceased’s relatives, and the court 
found that interests of the deceased’s personality were 
violated.59 
These two cases evoke concern about judicial 
opinions in China. Both cases were ruled on by primary 
courts, which rendered the two cases atypical, or at least not 
influential. Then, what standpoint did the Supreme People's 
Court take concerning posthumous harm? There are two 
texts to be reviewed, i.e. relevant judicial interpretation and 
                                                
	
	
58 See Wu Jianbo, Wu Yanping, Wu Jianbing, Wu Jieping Su Panyang Xian 
Yan Chi Huo Hua An [Lawsuit of delaying cremation against Poyang 
County filed by Wu Jianbo, Wu Yanping, Wu Jianbin and Wu Jieping] 
Panyang People’s Ct. 951 (2006) (China). 
59 See Gao Mou Su Chongqing Mou Xueyuan An [lawsuit brought by Gao 
against an university in Chongqing], Fifth Intermediate People’s Ct. of 
Chongqing 225 (2006) (China). 
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the representative cases published by Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Gong Bao (hereinafter “SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ.”).60 
 
1. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF POST-MORTEM REMEDY 
 
The Supreme People's Court has published five texts 
of judicial interpretation concerning posthumous harm: 
 a. Reply by the Supreme People's Court on the 
Protection of the Reputation of the Deceased (hereinafter 
“1989 judicial interpretation”);61  
b. Reply by the Supreme People's Court on the Legal 
Proceedings of the Case Filed by Fan Yinglian against Jing 
Yongxiang for Violation of Reputation Right of Haideng 
Master (hereinafter “1990 judicial interpretation”);62 
c. Reply by the Supreme People's Court on Several 
Questions Related to the Hearing of Reputation Right Cases 
                                                
	
	
60 The judicial interpretation and cases published in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Gongbao (hereinafter SUP. PEOPLE’S 
CT. GAZ.) are approved after the discussion of judicial committee of the 
Supreme People's Court. They represent the judicial standpoints of the 
Supreme People's Court. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Shen Pan Wei Yuan 
Hui Gong Zuo Shou Ze [the Working Principles of Judicial Committee of 
the Supreme People's Court], 1993 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 23 (1993) 
(China).  
61 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Siwang Ren De Mingyu Quan Ying 
Yifa Baohu De Fuhan [Communication regarding the Legal Protection of 
the Decease’s Right to Reputation by the Sup. People’s Ct.] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 12, 1989, effective Apr. 12, 1989) (China). 
62 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Fan Yinglian Su Jing Yongxiang Deng 
Qinhai Haideng Fashi Mingyuquan Yi An Youguan Susong Chengxu Wenti 
De Fuhan [A Reply of the Supreme People’s Ct. Concerning the 
Procedure Issues of the Defamation Case of Fan Yinglian v. Jing 
Yongxiang] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 27, 1990, 
effective Dec. 27, 1990) (China). 
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(hereinafter “1993 judicial interpretation”);63   
d. Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court on 
Several Questions related to Determining the Obligations of 
Spiritual Damage Compensation for Infringement of Civil 
Rights (hereinafter “2001 judicial interpretation”);64 and 
e. Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court on 
Several Questions related to the Applicable Laws of Personal 
Injury Compensation (hereinafter “2003 judicial 
interpretation”).65 
Among them, the 1993 judicial interpretation and 2001 
judicial interpretation mark two turning points. In the 1993 
judicial interpretation, the notion of the “right of reputation” 
of the deceased was abandoned and the term “reputation” 
was used.66 In the 2001 judicial interpretation, the scope of 
personality interests of the deceased was expanded to name, 
                                                
	
	
63 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Mingyuquan Anjian Ruogan 
Wenti De Jieshi [A Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging 
Defamation Cases by the Sup. People’s Ct.] (promulgated by the Sup. 
People’s Ct., Aug. 7, 1993, effective Aug. 7, 1993) (China) [hereinafter “A 
Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging Defamation Cases by the 
Sup. People’s Ct.”]. 
64 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Queding Minshi Qinquan Jingshen 
Peichang Zeren Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme 
People's Court on Problems regarding the Ascertainment of 
Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in Civil Torts] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2001, effective Mar. 10, 
2001) (China). 
65 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Renshen Sunhai Peichang 
Anjian Shiyong Falv Ruoguan Wenti De Jieshi [Interpretation of the 
Supreme People's Court of Some Issues concerning the Application of 
Law for the Trial of Cases on Compensation for Personal Injury] 
(promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 4, 2003, effective May. 1, 
2004) (China). 
66 A Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging Defamation Cases by 
the Sup. People’s Ct. supra note 63. 
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image, reputation, honor, privacy, body, and human 
remains.67 
 
2. ISSUED CASES OF POST-MORTEM REMEDY 
 
So far, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. has officially issued 
four cases of posthumous harm. In the case “Chen Xiuqin 
against Wei Xilin and Today Evening News of Tianjin for 
violation of reputation right in 1990” (hereinafter “Chen 
Xiuqin Case”), the accused made up a story and violated the 
reputation rights of both the deceased and the living 
people.68 It was ruled by Tianjin Intermediate People's Court 
that the deceased still enjoys the legal protection of 
reputation right.69 Plaintiff Chen Xiuqin was the mother of 
the deceased, Ji Wenzhen, and she had the right to file a suit 
against those who violated the reputation right of her 
daughter and herself, and to appeal for legal protection.70 
However, the court ruled the contrary for the same 
case of making up stories in “Li Lin sued Xinshengjie 
Magazine and He Jianming for the violation of reputation 
                                                
	
	
67 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Problems regarding 
the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional Damages in 
Civil Torts, supra note 64. 
68 In this case, the defendant published a novel based on the decedent’s 
life and stated that she died from a sexually transmitted disease. The 
dead’s mother alleged defamation and illegal appropriation of the 
likeness of her daughter. The court held that the dead’s right to 
reputation should be protected. [Lawsuit brought by Chen Xiuqin 
against Wei Xilin and Jin Wanbao] (Tianjin Interm People’s Ct. 1989) 
(China). 
69 Id. 
70 Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of the 
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China], 1990 SUP. 
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30 (China). 
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right” in 1997 (hereinafter “Li Siguang Case”).71 The court in 
the first instance ruled that the accused violated the 
reputation right of the deceased, and in the second instance, 
also ruled that even the posthumous reputation should not 
be violated.72 If the posthumous reputation of citizens are 
violated, their close relatives are entitled to pursue a claim.73 
It should be noted that in the judgment of second instance, 
the term “reputation” replaced “reputation right.” 
There is another case of right infringement by the 
media, namely “Peng Jiahui filed against the Chinese Story 
magazine in 2002 for the violation of reputation right” 
(hereinafter “Peng Jiazhen Case”).74 The Higher People's 
Court of Sichuan ruled that the act of making up a story 
about the accused violated the reputation right of Martyr 
Peng Jiazhen.75 Regarding the problem of whether the 
                                                
	
	
71 In this case, plaintiff sued a journal as well as an author for maligning 
her dead father by publication a documentary novel. The defendant was 
held liable for defamation. [Lawsuit brought by Li Lin against 
Xinshengjie Magazine and He Jianming] (Beijing High People’s Ct. 1997) 
(China). 
72 Id. 
73 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of the 
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] 1998 SUP. 
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 33 (China). 
74 Lawsuit brought by Peng Jiahui against China Story Journal, Sichuan 
High People’s Ct. 2002. In this case, the plaintiff’s brother was a hero and 
who died in an assassination in 1912. However, the defendant published 
a novel claiming that the brother escaped the killing and proceeded to 
engage immoral relationship with various women. Specially, the plaintiff 
passed away during the appeal and her children were allowed to 
continue the appeal and inherit the damages. The court affirmed the 
defamation charge. See Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan 
gongbao [Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic 
of China], 6 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 196 (2002) (China). 
75 Id. 
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interests of the living were violated, it was stated in the 
judgment that the act of filing a claim against the magazine 
for violation of the reputation of Martyr Peng Jiazhen by the 
relative Peng Jiahui was to safeguard the reputation of Peng 
Jiazhen, rather than the reputation of herself.76 The ruling in 
the first instance that the reputation of both the deceased 
and the relatives were violated has no legal basis.77 
In 2007, a case aroused widespread attention, namely 
“the Civil Administration Bureau of Gaochun County, 
Jiangsu accused Wang Changsheng, Lü Fang, and Jiangsu 
Branch of Tian An Life Insurance Co. Ltd for human injury 
compensation” (hereinafter “Anonymous Case”).78 This case 
makes us reflect upon the following issue: How does the 
infringement of the interests of the deceased bring about the 











78 Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of the 
Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China], 6 SUP. 
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 32 (2007) (China). The description of the case is as 
follows: a nameless vagrant was killed in a car accident, and his close 
relatives were nowhere to be found. Can the Ministry of Civil Affairs file 
a lawsuit as the plaintiff? The supporters believe that if the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs do not safeguard the interests of the vagrant, it will be an 
act of not respecting the right of life of the deceased. The opponents 
believe that the Ministry of Civil Affairs have the obligations of relief, 
but cannot execute the right of claim as a surrogate. The court finally 
ruled that the Ministry of Civil Affairs was not a qualified plaintiff of 
civil litigation, and the complaint was rejected. 
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(This figure is based on the claim and holding of the cases.) 
 
B. LEGAL FORMANTS 
 
As textual analysis shows, the standpoint adopted for 
the jurisdiction of posthumous harm in China is inconsistent. 
The Chinese court in the Chen Xiuqin Case first admitted the 
protection of the interests of the deceased in 1990.79 This was 
not prudent legislation, but rather it was a legislative 
response to external pressure because personality rights 
were central to the economic reform movement.80 An 
illustration of this point is the fact that the two earlier 
judicial interpretations were made in the form of reply by 
the Supreme People's Court’s instruction to the lower court. 
                                                
	
	
79 See Lawsuit brought by Chen Xiuqin against Wei Xilin and Jin 
Wanbao, supra note 68. 
80 Hilary K. Josephs, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Press in the 
People’s Republic of China, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 191, 192 (1992). 
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Academic opinions also differ greatly. In light of the 
actual problems of judicial practice, Chinese scholars have 
proposed the following representative ideas: protection of 
the rights of the deceased, protection of the interests of the 
deceased, protection of the rights of the close relatives, 
heritage of the interests of personality, family interests, and 
extended protection.81 All of these ideas attempt to provide a 
legal basis for posthumous harm relief. However, I found 
that most scholars are faced with a predicament: if the rights 
of the deceased are acknowledged, then it contradicts the 
system of legal capacity; if the rights of the deceased are not 
                                                
	
	
81 See generally Ge Yunsong, Sizhe Shengqian Rengeliyi De Minfa Baohu 
[protection of civil law for ante-mortem interests of the deceased], BIJIAOFA 
TANJIU [J. COMP. L.] 4 (2002).  For earlier representative opinions, see Guo 
Lin and Zhang Gu, Shilun Woguo Minfa Dui Sizhe Mingyuquan De Baohu 
[On Civil Law Protection on the Reputation Right of the Deceased in China], 
SHANGHAI FAXUE YANJIU [SHANGHAI JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY] 6 (1991); 
Lixin Yang, Renshen Quan Fa Lun [Personal Right Law], BEIJING: CHINA 
INSPECTION PRESS 273 (1994); Wang Liming, Rengequan Fa Xin Lun [New 
Ideas on Personal Right Law], CHANGCHUN: JILIN PEOPLES PRESS 444 (1994); 
Ma Changhua, Lun Sizhe Mingyu De Falü Bao Hu [Legal Protection on the 
Reputation of the Deceased: a Discussion with Yang Lixin and others], FA 
SHANG YANJIU [STUD. IN L. & BUS.], 6 (1996). For a more detailed 
elaboration on the above theories, see Ge Yunsong, Sizhe Shengqian 
Rengeliyi De Minfa Baohu [protection of civil law for ante-mortem interests of 
the deceased], BIJIAOFA TANJIU [J. COMP. L.] 4 (2002).  For earlier 
representative opinions, see Guo Lin and Zhang Gu, Shilun Woguo Minfa 
Dui Sizhe Mingyuquan De Baohu [On Civil Law Protection on the Reputation 
Right of the Deceased in China], SHANGHAI FAXUE YANJIU [SHANGHAI 
JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY] 6 (1991).  Yang Lixin, Renshen Quan Fa Lun 
[Personal Right Law], BEIJING: CHINA INSPECTION PRESS, 273 (1994); Wang 
Liming, Rengequan Fa Xin Lun [New Ideas on Personal Right Law], 
CHANGCHUN: JILIN PEOPLES PRESS 444 (1994); Ma Changhua, Lun Sizhe 
Mingyu De Falü Bao Hu [Legal Protection on the Reputation of the Deceased: 
A Discussion with Yang Lixin and others], FA SHANG YANJIU [STUD. IN L. & 
BUS.] 6 (1996).  
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acknowledged, then it is difficult to fulfill the moral 
requirements which should be met by the civil code. 
Behind this predicament is a methodology deadlock: 
since the year 1900, such domains of philosophy of law as 
personality and right, or right and interests, all center 
around the natural living person, thus constituting the legal 
basis of traditional civil law.82 However, the intrusion of the 
concept of the deceased has caused a rupture on the wall of 
uncertainty constructed by the civil code.83 We have to admit 
that the theoretical predicament results in the loss of 
direction in practice. Thus, we are compelled to return to the 
logical origin of the theory of civil law. I believe that the 
legal justification could be found in the basic domains of the 
philosophy of law. 
In sum, the deceased people cannot rise from the 
grave to file a lawsuit. We have to establish a legal 
mechanism that enables the living to safeguard the 
posthumous interests. I will provide the answer of legal 
fiction to this issue. 
 
III. LEGAL REASONING OF POSTHUMOUS HARM IN CIVIL LAW 
 
In reference to the “historical development of law,”84 
to quote Maine, “legal fiction is the tortuous route of law 
development usually chosen by ‘a curious artifice of legal 
reasoning.”85 The interests of the deceased are fictionalized 
as the rights of the living based on an accepted hypothesis, 
                                                
	
	
82 See Xianfeng, supra note 47, at 53-65. 
83 Herman Shael, From Philosophers to Legislators, and Legislators to Gods: 
The French Civil Code as Secular Scripture. 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 597 (1984). 
84 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 16 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1977). 
85 Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
1 (2010). 
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i.e. that the civil law is historically set up to deal with the 
living. Consequently, the legal capacity of human beings is 
simply configured between life and death in civil law.86 To 
achieve equilibrium between systematic harmony and the 
protection of the deceased, I would hereby argue that civil 
law has to construct the bridge between life and death by 
virtue of legal fiction as a tortuous way of law development. 
 
A. POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS ON THE TEMPORAL SCALE 
 
Insulting the body may be a crime, whereas spitting 
on the portrait of the deceased only incurs moral accusation. 
After the natural person has died, what are the interests to 
be protected by civil law? Considering when a posthumous 
interest occurs (prior to, at, or after death), I divide the 
interests of the deceased into three types in accordance with 
the occurrence point on the temporal scale: extended interests, 




                                                
	
	
86 This notion is definitely expressed at art. 1 of German Civil Code: “The 
legal capacity of a human being begins on the completion of birth.” See 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002, § 1, sentence 
1, (Ger). Similarly, the French Law No. 75-17 in 1975 made it clear in art. 
1 that “The law secures the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault 
on human dignity and guarantees the respect of every human being 
from the beginning of life.” See Loi No. 75-17 du 17 janvier 1975 relative à 
l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse [Law No. 75-17 of January 17, 
1975, Regarding Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL 
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE  FRANÇAISE  [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 
18, 1975, p. 739; see also Laurence Brunet & Sonia Desmoulin, ‘Human 
Embryo, Chimerical Embryo: What Legal Status in French Law’, 1 J. CIV. L. 
STUD. 85 (2008). 
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1. EXTENDED INTERESTS 
 
Here, I designate the interests, which start in the 
living period and are preserved after death as the term 
extended interests. Under the legal context in China, not only 
do they include most of the non-pecuniary interests such as 
privacy, name, image, and reputation, but they also include 
some pecuniary interests, such as the publication right.87 
From the perspective of the temporal scale, all extended 
interests originated during the life of man, and the content of 
those interests are consistent before and after the point of 
                                                
	
	
87 Under Chinese law, “copyright” shall include seventeen types of 
personal rights and property rights. As the foremost right among them, 
“the right of publication, that is, the right to decide whether to make a 
work available to the public.” See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Zhu 
Zuo Quan Fa (中华人民共和著作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Pres. Order No. 31 of Sept. 7, 
1990, effective June 1, 1991; amended by Standing Comm. Nat’l People's 
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death.88 In fact, violating the publication right of the 
deceased is derived from the fact that the author possesses 
the identity of an author before death. These interests occur 
during one's life; they are the natural extension of ante-
mortem interests and, hence, I name them “extended 
interests” in this article. 
The main feature of extended interests is that legal 
protection crosses the boundary of life and death. In judicial 
practice, the cases of posthumous harm are mostly related to 
the violation of non-pecuniary interests of the deceased, 
typically the reputation.89 In my opinion, there is no 
substantial difference between reputation infringement to 
the deceased and the living, because both center around the 
social comment on ante-mortem behavior. For instance, 
defaming X during his life is the same as defaming him after 
his death. As long as it impairs the social reputation of X, the 
act can be considered a violation.  
 
2. CONVERTED INTERESTS 
 
If a person is killed in a car accident, why are his close 
                                                
	
	
88 For example, according to the Article 21 of Copyright Law of the 
People's Republic of China, “[i]n respect of a work of a citizen, the term 
of protection of the right of publication and of the rights provided in 
Items (5) through (17) of Paragraph 1 of Article 10 of this Law shall be 
the lifetime of the author and fifty years after his death, expiring on 
December 31 of the fiftieth year after his death. In the case of a work of 
joint authorship, such term shall expire on December 31 of the fiftieth 
year after the death of the last surviving author.” Id. art. 21. 
89 In China, the earliest and most controversial cases regarding to 
posthumous harm are related to defamation of the dead. See Lawsuit 
brought by Chen Xiuqin against Wei Xilin and Jin Wanbao, supra note 68, 
and Lawsuit brought by Li Lin against Xinshengjie Magazine and He 
Jianming, supra note 71. 
168 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
relatives entitled to claim the monetary compensation for his 
death? At first glance, the answer seems straightforward. 
However, we may ignore a simple truth: personality rights 
are personal, but the plaintiff actually profits from the 
other’s death. Thus, the question arises: Who is matter-of-
factly harmed, the decedent or his relatives? 
In my opinion, the legal basis of pecuniary 
compensation for death can be interpreted by the term 
converted interests. This type of interest moves between the 
deceased and the third party. For example, at the moment of 
X's death caused by a car accident, the chain of causality can 
be described as follows in jurisprudence: 
  X’s unlawful death → violation of right of life → the 
compensation for damage of death is generated → the deceased 
person, X, cannot claim this compensation → the compensation 
interests are transferred to the close relatives of X.  
The phenomenon of converted interests is more 
complex than extended interests due to the fact that its 
occurrence and capturing are almost synchronous. However, 
the logical model only exists in the imagination of the jurists. 
The general public only notices the death of X as the cause, 
and the death compensation right enjoyed by the close 
relative of X as the effect.90 The specific causal relationship is 
ignored, which is the reason for a multitude of theoretical 
disputes. 
 
3. BODY INTERESTS 
 
The body of the deceased is a complex bundle of 
                                                
	
	
90 See generally David Friedman, “What is ‘fair compensation’ for death or 
injury?”, 2.1 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 81, 81-93 (1982) (discussing the 
difference between how to compensate a death versus an injury).  
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interests. On the one hand, it is related to the personality 
dignity of the deceased. Body interests aims to secure the 
integrity of the body, especially protecting organs of the 
deceased against being removed without the approval of the 
owner during his life.91 On the other hand, the body is also a 
physical entity. After cremation and burial, the family enjoys 
the interests related to the grave according to convention. 
Therefore, body interests are the combination of personality 
interests of the deceased and the family interest of the 
deceased. 
The violation of body interests is usually entangled 
with folk custom, ethics, and spiritual damage. It is perhaps 
the most controversial topic in the case of posthumous harm 
in China. The grave-related disputes usually have familial 
and temporal aspects (near Qingming Festival, which is also 
known as Tomb Sweeping Day and noted for its connection 
with Chinese ancestral veneration92). The orders are hard to 
be implemented due to the deep-rooted Feng Shui concept.93 
Many courts face the dilemma of difficult jurisdiction and 
execution. According to recent fieldwork by my students in 
                                                
	
	
91 The events of violating the integrity of the body occur throughout the 
world, especially the celebrities. For instance, Einstein made the will of 
cremation after death, but his brain was preserved for the name of 
scientific research. This event triggered the debate on ethics of science. 
92 See generally Alice G. Yick and Rashmi Gupta, “Chinese cultural 
dimensions of death, dying, and bereavement: Focus group findings.” 9.2 J. 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY 32, 37 (2002) (discussing the different Chinese 
rituals related to death and dying).  
93 According to the concept of Feng Shui, a graveyard with good Feng 
Shui can protect the owner’s offspring and bring them peace, health, 
fortune, good luck and other positive qualities. Graveyard Fung Shui, 
TRAVEL CHINA GUIDE (last visited October 4, 2015), 
http://www.travelchinaguide.com/intro/astrology/fengshui/graveyar
d.htm. 
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Hunan Province, the disputes related to the impaired 
ancestral graves (appearance and structure of grave and the 
remains buried in the grave) accounted for about 60%; the 
disputes related to graves occupying the contracted land of 
others or secret burial of the body accounted for 31%; the 
disputes related to the scrabble for the bone ash accounted 
for about 9%.94 
 
Figure 3. Legal Interests Survive Death95 
 
B. PROCESS OF FICTIONALIZATION 
 
As Fuller noted, legal fiction was “an indispensable 
instrument of human thinking.”96 By making an analogy, 
different legal facts are attributed with similar legal 
interpretation. As a way of explanation, legal fiction is 
                                                
	
	
94 See Peng Yanhua, Grave Site-Related Disputes (2010) (unpublished) 
(on file with the Undergraduate Innovation Project of L. Sch. of Nanjing). 
95 Chart areas A and B refer to the legal interests that cannot survive the 
death, whereas areas C and D refer to the legal interests that can survive 
the death or occur after the death. 
96 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 25 (Stanford University Press, 1967). 
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frequently used for posthumous harm cases. This prevents 
face-to-face conflicts with the traditional civil law with 
worldliness features and makes the rigid law more flexible 
by resorting to circuitous strategy.97 
 
1. FICTIONALIZATION OF EXTENDED INTERESTS 
 
Legal fiction is to treat the different as equivalent.98 
The process of legal reasoning is as follows: suppose α→β, 
then α'→β. For example, a corporation is treated as if it were 
a natural person, and an adopted child is treated as if he 
were reborn as a member of his adopted family.99 In the case 
of posthumous harm, similarly, extended interests belonging 
to the deceased are treated as if they belonged to the living. 
Chen Xiuqin Case is China's first case of posthumous 
harm.100 There, the legal reasoning of “treating the different 
as equivalent” was adopted:  
 
Death only deprives of legal capacity, but the 
specific civil rights acquired during one's life 
are still protected by law. For instance, we may 
vindicate the victims who die in the political 
movements and restore their reputation. It is 
an act of protecting the reputation right of the 
deceased. For criminals sentenced to death, the 
                                                
	
	
97 Even in common law, legal fictions “were the primary tools to deal 
with new situations or to do justice without disturbing the law’s putative 
stability.” Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate 
Uses of Legal Ficton in Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 58 (1989). 
98 See FULLER, supra note 96, at 21-22. 
99 See Knauer, supra note 85, at 9-10. 
100 See Lawsuit brought by Chen Xiuqin against Wei Xilin and Jin 
Wanbao], supra note 68. 
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criminal law specifies that their political rights 
are deprived. This shows from another 
perspective that the ante-mortem civil rights of 
citizens are still protected by law after death.101 
Literally, α (the living citizen with legal capacity) is 
not equivalent to α' (the deceased without legal capacity). 
But, since α→β (violation of reputation right), it can be 
inferred that α'→β (violation of reputation right). The device 
of legal fiction baldly treats the two different legal facts in 
the same way. Consequently, a human being’s legal interests 
during life are extended to the period after death in China's 
judicial decision. The 2001 Judicial Explanation considered 
the personality interests such as name, portrait, reputation, 
honor, and privacy of the deceased as the extension of the 
ante-mortem interests.102 Meanwhile, Article 21 in Copyright 
Law in China extends the ante-mortem publication right of 
the author to 50 years after death.103 These two articles 
represent the legal logics of ‘treating the different as 
equivalent.’ 
                                                
	
	
101 Zhonghu arenmin gongheguo zuigao renmin fayuan gongbao [Gazette of 
the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China] 2 SUP. 
PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30, 31 (1990) (China) [hereinafter “2 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. 
GAZ. 30”]. 
102 See Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Problems 
regarding the Ascertainment of Compensation Liability for Emotional 
Damages in Civil Torts, supra note 64. 
103 According to this article, the term of protection for the right of 
publication and other rights shall be the lifetime of the author and fifty 
years after his death. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Zhu Zuo Quan 
Fa (中华人民共和著作权法) [Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Pres. Order No. 31 of Sept. 7, 1990, effective 
June 1, 1991; amended by Standing Comm. Nat’l People's Cong., Feb. 26, 
2010), art. 21. 
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2. FICTIONALIZATION OF CONVERTED INTERESTS  
 
The protection of converted interests in the case of 
posthumous harm is realized by legal fiction as well. In the 
case of monetary compensation for death, to explain the 
right of claiming by the close relatives, there are two 
opposing theories in traditional civil law, namely, 
inheritable property or intrinsic damage.104 The controversy 
is still going on in China.105 As far as the theory of 
inheritable property is concerned, the theoretical dilemma is 
that, before the death of the victim, we cannot say that the 
right of life has been deprived.106 Thus, the right to life injury 
compensation does not survive. After the death of the 
victim, the qualification as a civil subject is lost.  Hence, the 
right to life injury compensation does not hold either. 
Although the theory of intrinsic damage seems more 
explicit, it also has its defects: the third party suffering from 
the loss due to the death of the victim is not the direct victim 
after all. Who is matter-of-factly harmed, the deceased 
person or his relatives? The jurisprudential basis is not 
sound. 
Legal justification can be compared to a well-
organized attack on the football field. Sometimes all we need 
is the final kick. Rationality of the theory of intrinsic damage 
                                                
	
	
104 In China's judicial practice, the scope of close relatives of the victims 
may not completely overlap with that of the inheritors. Chinese courts 
seldom regard the pecuniary compensation for death as the heritage. It 
means that the debtee cannot request the close relatives to pay the debt 
with compensation money for the deceased person. 
105 See Qu Maohui and Wu Bin, Shouhairen Jinqinshu Quewei De Siwang 
Peichang Falü Wenti [Legal Issues of Death Compensation in the Absence of 
Close Relatives of the Deceased], FA XUE [L.  SCI.] 2 (2008). 
106 See Friedman, supra note 90, at 82. 
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is that the interests of the victim and the third party are 
clearly differentiated. However, it fails to point out the 
logical conversion between the two. In the death 
compensation cases, α (basic fact) is the death of the victim; 
β (presumptive fiction) is that the intrinsic interests of the 
close relatives are violated; γ (judicial outcome) is that ‘the 
close relatives claim the compensation.’ Since β belongs to 
the fiction, it means that there is no need to prove whether 
the intrinsic interests of the close relatives indeed are 
violated. The court knows for sure that the intrinsic interests 
of the close relatives are not violated, yet the right to claim 
compensation still holds.107 
Such fiction is the decisive fiction made by the 
legislators. It is a legal policy consideration based on logic. 
To simplify the legal relations, the legislators may 
intentionally (or accidentally) omit the intermediate logical 
steps. Thus, the logical chain of α→β→γ has been shortened 
to α→γ.108 As long as the basic fact (death of victim) holds, 
the judicial outcome of claiming for compensation by the 
close relatives occurs. Hence, the interests of the deceased 
                                                
	
	
107 Consider an extreme situation: parents want to abandon their newly 
born baby, who is killed in a medical accident. There is no such thing as 
compensation for the acquirable benefits for the fosterers before the 
death of the baby. The parents of the baby suffer from no spiritual harm. 
However, the hospital cannot refuse to pay the death compensation 
using this as its defense. It can be seen that death compensation is a legal 
fiction that is not overthrown by counterevidence. 
108 Art. 18 in Tort Liability Law (P.R.C.) provides that the close relatives 
of the victim have the right to require the infringer to bear the tort 
liability. See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Qin Quan Ze Ren Fa (中华人
民共和国侵权责任法) [Tort Liability Law of the People’s Republic of 
China) (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 21, effective July 1, 2010], 
art. 59. 
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and the living are bridged. 
 
3. FICTIONALIZATION OF BODY INTERESTS 
 
There are no omniscient legislators in the world. 
Where there are no mature legal principles to be applied to a 
lawsuit, the judges will resort to a generally acceptable legal 
principle to settle the dispute. This tool is another kind of 
fiction. 
The treatment of body interest is a legal loophole that 
remains to be mended. The protection of the integrity of the 
body can be analogous to the legal relief given to personality 
interests such as reputation, privacy, and image of the 
deceased. However, the common interests of the family, 
symbolized by the grave, cannot be protected by any mature 
legal principles in China.  
From the perspective of comparative law, it can be 
seen that grave protection is usually implemented by 
making an analogy with the ownership of private land. This 
does not apply to the transfer of heritage.109 In ancient 
China, the grave and the land on which it is situated were 
inseparable.110 The disputes over the grave site were usually 
                                                
	
	
109 By contrast, according to civil law of France, the living spouse and the 
closest relatives enjoy rights related to the cemetery, even though he or 
she does not inherit the properties of the deceased; the family cemetery 
is transferred by lineage, and is jointly owned; it should not be auctioned 
or divided. See FRANCOIS TERRE AND PHILIPPEE SIMLER, DROIT CIVIL: LES 
BIENS (Dalloz 3rd ed.1985) (France). 
110 Family grave land have been generally recognized as the joint family 
property, which has existed in China for at least two millennia. See H. 
Franz Schurmann, Traditional Property Concepts in China, FAR EASTERN Q. 
507, 510 (1956). 
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settled by resorting to the law for land disputes.111 However, 
this method will not work for modern-day China. On the 
one hand, since the land is not private,112 the ownership of 
the grave and land is separated. On the other hand, the 
period of existence of grave site (especially ancestral grave) 
is much longer than the history of the People’s Republic of 
China. The terms of use “right of contracted land” and 
“construction land” are limited usufruct rights.113 Thus, 
property law cannot provide stable and predictable relief. 
Moreover, if the person enjoying the right to land 
contractual management is not the offspring of the owner of 
the grave, there will be disputes over ownership. For 
example, according to the finding of Peng’s field work,114 the 
contracted land of village A in Wugang City, Hunan Province 
was the site of ancestral grave of village B. But the residents 
of village B forbade the residents of village A to cultivate the 
                                                
	
	
111 For example, Yu Ling Tu Ce (Scale Atlas) was a basic land registration 
system in Ming and Qing Dynasty. The grave sites were registered and 
the nature of grave site-related disputes was dispute over land. See Wang 
Qingdai, Qingdai Huizhou Yuling Tuce Yanjiu: Yi Xiuning Xian Xinbian 
Gongkou Yuling Xianye De Mingkuce Wei Zhongxin [Study of Scale Atlas in 
Huizhou of Qing Dynasty: with the Latest Scale Atlas of Xiuning County as 
the Center], 4 LISHI YANJIU [HISTORICAL RESEARCH] 53-69 (2006).  
112 According to Constitution in China, land in the cities is owned by the 
state; land in the rural and suburban area is owned by collectives except 
for those portions which belongs to the state. XIANFA art. 10 (1982) 
(China). 
113 In Chisese property law, “a usufructuary rights holder shall enjoy the 
right to possess, use and seek proceeds from the real property or 
movable property owned by someone else according to legal 
provisions.” See Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Wu Quan Fa (中华人民
共和国物权法) [Property Law of the People’s Republic of China] 
(promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Oct. 1, 2010), art. 117. 
114 See Yanhua, supra note 94. 
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land. As a retaliation, the residents of village A excavated the 
ancestral grave of village B and poured feces on the grave.115 
The struggle lasted for eight years.116 Therefore, it is not 
feasible to settle the disputes over body interests by referring 
to property law. When a lawsuit is filed, the court can only 
rule by legal fiction according to the common public order 
and customs. 
Legal fiction is simple, but it is not a sound approach. 
Rather, it is usually a last resort for judges. As a crutch for 
thinking, the reasoning process of legal fiction has obvious 
defects that make it susceptible to the accusation of cyclic 
demonstration.117 The use of legal fiction should be strictly 
controlled. 
In sum, when the respect for the ethical requirements 
of the deceased is not represented by modern civil law due 
to the worldliness feature, legal fiction will work as a simple 
pathway for legal development.118 At a minimum, it can 
provide a reasonable explanation of the civil law mechanism 
that crosses the boundary between life and death. 
 
IV. LAW DEVELOPMENT OF POSTHUMOUS HARM IN CHINA 
 
Posthumous cases have been dealt with in the absence 





117 See KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 
[METHODOLOGY OF JURISPRUDENCE] 144 (Chen Ai'e trans., Chinese 
Commercial Press 2003) (China). 
118 An interesting example of legal fiction that constructs the bridge 
between the life and death is posthumous marriage in France, which can 
legitimize children born after their father’s death, making them his heirs 
under French law. See Craig S. Smith, Paris Journal: A Love that Transcends 
Death Is Blessed by the State, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2004), at A4. 
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of a set of clearly defined rules in China for the past 20 
years.119 Now China has come to a crossroads. Along with 
social development, neglecting the interests of the deceased 
is obviously not a wise choice by China's civil legislature.  
 
A. PATH OF RELIEF 
 
Converted interests are fictionalized as the intrinsic 
right of the living, as legislated in Article 18 of Tort Liability 
Law.120 On the legislative level, the extended interests and 
body interests have to be discussed further. Interests, in the 
context of civil law, refer to legal interests, both in the 
general and narrow sense. The general articles in Tort 
Liability Law in China treat interests as equivalent to rights, 
which is a narrow approach.121 When the extended interests 
                                                
	
	
119 2 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ. 30, supra note 101. 
120 According to the Article 18 of Tort Law of the People's Republic of 
China, “Where a tort causes the death to the victim, the close relative of 
the victim shall be entitled to require the tortfeasor to assume the tort 
liability. Where the victim of a tort, which is an entity, is split or merged, 
the entity succeeding to the rights of the victim shall be entitled to 
require the tortfeasor to assume the tort liability. Where a tort causes the 
death to the victim, those who have paid the medical treatment 
expenses, funeral service fees and other reasonable costs and expenses 
for the victim shall be entitled to require the tortfeasor to compensate 
them for such costs and expenses, except that the tortfeasor has already 
paid such costs and expenses.” Tort Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (promulgated by Standing Committee of the Eleventh Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) art. 18, at 3.  
121 Some Chinese scholars divide legal interests into rights and interests 
not yet elevated to rights. The latter category includes the protection of 
the interests of the deceased and of fetuses, neighborhood relation, 
possession, natural obligation, unregistered trademark, pure economic 
loss, commercial secrets, etc. See Sun Shan, Xunzhao Bei Yiwang De Fayi 
[Seeking for the forgotten legal interests], 1 FALÜ KEXUE [SCIENCE OF LAW] 
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and body interests are damaged, the decision of whether to 
choose protection of an interest-based model or a right-
based model as the path of relief has to be made by the 
legislators.122 
This is different from common law, which believes 
that the evolution of the life of law has been through 
experience rather than logic;123 logic is more important than 
experience in civil law. “If the logic is wrong, the system will 
have intrinsic defects, and all deductions will be wrong. 
Though one specific case may conform to experience, the 
other cases cannot be dealt with properly.”124 Thus, for 
China's Civil Code, which is currently being drafted, the 
concepts have to be concise and the logic has to be 
appropriate. More importantly, the intrinsic requirements of 
the system have to be satisfied. Posthumous harm cases fall 
into the category of Tort law.125 However, the basic 




122 According to the Article 2 of Tort Law of the People's Republic of 
China, “those who infringe upon civil rights and interests shall be subject 
to the tort liability according to this Law. ‘Civil rights and interests’ used 
in this Law shall include the right to life, the right to health, the right to 
name, the right to reputation, the right to honor, right to self image, right 
of privacy, marital autonomy, guardianship, ownership, usufruct, 
security interest, copyright, patent right, exclusive right to use a 
trademark, right to discovery, equities, right of succession, and other 
personal and property rights and interests.” Tort Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (promulgated by Standing Committee of the Eleventh 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) art. 2, at 1-2. 
123 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897). 
124 SU YONGQIN, JOINING CIVIL LEGISLATION AND PRIVATE LAW 22 (Peking 
Univ. Press, 2005). 
125 From the viewpoint of judges in the Chinese supreme court, cases of 
posthumous harm are related to “other personal and property rights and 
interests” listed by Article 2 of Tort Law of the People's Republic of 
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principles in the general articles of civil code have to be 
obeyed, especially the general requirements of the system of 
civil subjects. Although the right-based model is clearly 
defined, legal capacity is the first problem that needs to be 
tackled before conferring rights to the deceased. There are 
two solutions to this: abrogating the phrase “legal capacity” 
completely or revising the connotation of “legal capacity” to 
grant dead people the same right. Both of these solutions 
will completely overthrow the existing system of civil 
subjects, thus incurring high institutional cost.126 
Instead, if the posthumous interests are protected as 
legal interests, then the system of civil subjects founded 
upon legal capacity will not falter. Moreover, the interests-
based model cannot only satisfy the systemic requirements 
of modern civil law, but it can also preserve the flexibility of 
legal application. Once the legal interests are upgraded to 
rights, the space of freedom of other people will be 
restricted, although the individual benefits will be 
guaranteed. Thus, the rights with undefined connotations 
and objects should be avoided so as to create predictable 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
China. Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
Standing Committee of the Eleventh Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, 
effective July 1, 2010) art. 2, at 1-2; see also Xi, supra note 9, at 27. 
126 In common law system without the principle of legal capacity, the 
legislative examples of directly conferring rights to the deceased are 
more popular. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit stressed in a judgment in 1991, “[t]he importance of 
establishing rights in a dead body has been, and will continue to be, 
magnified by scientific advancements.” Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d. 
477, 481 (4th Cir. 1991). For representative literature, see Matthew H. 
Kramer, Do Animals and Dead People Have Legal Rights? 14 CAN. J.L. & 
JURIS. 29 (2001). It is believed by other scholars that the rights enjoyed by 
the deceased should be only moral rights. See CARL WELLMAN, REAL 
RIGHTS 146-157 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).  
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social order. Due to the slow progression of civil law, rights 
that protect personality interests will not be protected 
immediately.127 We can only guarantee a small range of 
interests, leaving many more interests uncovered. There are 
many atypical interests of personality that need to be 
protected. The precedent case theory, with its high 
flexibility, naturally serves as the lubricant for the rigidity of 
legislation. 
As mentioned above, the interests of the deceased are 
entangled with morality, custom, and social policy. Both 
connotation and denotation are uncertain. If the protection 
of the deceased follows the right-based model, clear 
standards should be formulated for determining rights and 
providing relief. This creates huge difficulty for legislation. 
On the contrary, by referring to the general articles in Tort 
Liability Law in China, the interest-based model can be 
revised constantly when the interests of the deceased are 
protected as legal interests. The flexibility of legal 
application not only relieves the burden of civil code, but 
also upgrades the law. This is the least-worst solution. 
 
B. RANKS OF HUMAN VALUE 
 
The interests of the deceased are considered legal 
interests rather than rights, which implies common sense: 
the deceased person is not and should not be treated on the 
same level as the living one. At present, there are many cases 
of conflict of interests between the deceased and the 
                                                
	
	
127 See generally Xue Jun, Renge Quan De Lianzhong Jiben Lilun Moshi Yu 
Zhongguo De Renge Quan Lifa [Two Basic Theoretical Models of Interests 
of Personality and China's Legislation of Interests of Personality], 4 FA 
SHANG YAN JIU [STUDIES IN LAW AND BUSINESS] 10-11 (2004).  
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living.128 A typical example is the prevalence of land 
competition between the deceased and the living as the 
demand for graves increases sharply, namely the campaign 
labeled “flatten graves to return farmland,” in China.129 
Moreover, organ donation from the deceased and the 
disclosure of disease information prior to death are also 
areas where the interests of the deceased and the living are 
in conflict.130 Because of the limited judicial resources, the 
law cannot protect all kinds of interests, so there has to be a 
rank of interests. As Smolensky observed, the fact that an 
interest survives death does not mean that this posthumous 
interest is under legal protection.131 The general principle is, 
to reflect the proper values of society, that law gives greater 
protection to the living than to the dead.  
The law protects the greater interest better than 
inferior interests. On the level of normative jurisprudence, 
the priority of values is manifested as the difference in 
priority of validity.132 According to the principle of civil law, 
protected interests rank lower than protected rights, i.e. the 
preconditions for interest protection are stricter than those of 
                                                
	
	
128 See Xiao, supra note 18, at 71-72. 
129 See Macartney, supra note 6, at 40. 
130 See William DeJong, et al., Requesting Organ Donation: An Interview 
Study of Donor and Nondonor Families, 7 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 13 (1998). 
131 Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 
773 (2009). Along the same lines, the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code uses the term ‘legally relevant’ to limit the interest which is worthy 
of legal protection. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER & MAURO BUSSANI, 
PURE ECONOMIC LOSS: NEW HORIZONS IN COMPARATIVE LAW 37 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2009). 
132 Dale Smith, Law, Justice and the Unity of Value, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 383-40 (2012).  
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rights.133 In Tort Liability Law of China, legal relief is not 
provided to the subjects when his or her interests are 
maliciously violated.134 To fix the liability of the offender in 
posthumous harm cases, the act of violation, fact of harm, 
and causal relationship have to be clear.135 More 
importantly, it has to be proven that the offender committed 
the violation on purpose.136 For example, pouring feces on 
the grave of others and manufacturing advertisements for 
gravestones using the image of the deceased without 
authorization are all morally accusable. In other words, in 
case that posthumous interest is at stake, legal protection can 
only be taken when the defendant acts with malice or with 
gross negligence. 
Exceptionally, the rights of the living rank lower than 
posthumous interests under some special circumstances: 
First of all, when the ante-mortem wills of the deceased are 
contradicted. Suppose A has made a testament that he will 
not donate his cornea after death, but his close relative B 
believes that the donation of the cornea can benefit medical 
research and donates the deceased’s cornea on his own 
initiative. This donation is considered invalid and will be 
revoked. Furthermore, if the deceased has made a will 
during his life not to publish his works, then the ownership 
of the manuscripts enjoyed by the inheritors does not 
surpass the will of the deceased.137  
                                                
	
	
133 Randall P Peerenboom, Rights, interests, and the interest in rights in 
China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 359 (1995). 
134 See Xi, supra note 9, at 26. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 The manuscripts of Franz Kafka, a great master in modern western 
literature, were preserved by the will executor Marx Broder, who edited 
and published all the works of Kafka against his will. Hence, Kafka won 
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Additionally, posthumous interests can be elevated 
under good social custom. For example, in China's rural 
areas, some cemeteries are contracted to others by the village 
collectively. This may give rise to conflicts between the right 
to land contractual management and the body interests of 
the deceased. Although the defendant is a property right 
holder, posthumous interest ought to be protected when 
superstitious ceremonies are carried out at the cemetery of 
the plaintiff’s mother, according to the good social custom, 
which should be respected by local residents.138 However, 
the good social custom has to conform to the domain-
specificity requirement. The funeral custom extensively 
accepted by the local residents is considered the standard. 
For instance, the “sky burial”139 in Tibetan areas and 
“grassland funeral”140 in Inner Mongolian areas are unique 
funerals with a complete set of ceremonies. It cannot be 
																																								 																																							 																																							 															
	
	
worldwide reputation. If controlled by Chinese Copyright Law, this act 
would violate Kafka’s publication right. 
138 In this case, the accused dispelled ghosts on the grave of the mother of 
resident surnamed Yang in the same village. It was ruled by the court 
that the accused violated the reputation right of the deceased and that 
the spiritual harm compensation of 350 yuan should be paid to Yang. See 
Wu Ruxin, Zai Taren Fenshang ‘Qu Gui’ Qinquan [It is violation of the 
Interests of the Deceased by “Dispelling Ghosts” on neighbor’s Grave], 
GUIZHOU SHANG BAO [Guizhou Business Daily] (Nov. 29, 2003), at 5.  
139 Sky burial (Tibetan: !་གཏོར་) is a funeral practice in which a human 
corpse is placed on a mountaintop to decompose while exposing to the 
elements or to be eaten by scavenging animals, especially birds of prey. 
It is a specific type of the general practice of excarnation. See generally 
Funeral reforms edge along in Tibetan areas, SINA ENGLISH (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://english.sina.com/china/2012/1213/537423.html. 
140 LiaoYang. The Patriarchal Characteristics of the Funeral Arrangements and 
Sacrificial Rites of the Nomadic in Ancient Northern China, 1 NATIONALITIES 
RESEARCH IN QINGHAI 146-53 (2007). 
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determined as posthumous harm if the body is left unburied 
in an open field. 
 
C. LIGATION EXECUTIVE 
 
In posthumous harm cases, the deceased cannot act as 
the litigant. Thus, there arises the problem of who is entitled 
to the litigation right. The 1993 judicial explanation by the 
Supreme People's Court holds that when the reputation of 
the deceased is harmed, the close relatives have the right to 
file a lawsuit.141 The problem is that when the extended 
interests of the deceased are violated, the deceased is still the 
subject, and the close relatives are not the subjects of the 
legal interests. How can the close relatives of the deceased be 
the qualified plaintiffs? To answer this question, I suggest 
that the litigation executive theory can be applied to 
improve the procedural law for posthumous harm cases. 
When the subject of litigation and the civil subject are 
one and the same, it is an ideal scenario for civil cases. 
However, the separation of the two is not rare. In a typical 
case, the will executor, liquidator, and the collective 
copyright management organization enjoy the litigation 
right but no substantive rights. Then comes the problem of 
litigation executive. According to the definition given by 
legal scholars, litigation executive refers to the following 
situation: the third party enjoys the qualification of the 
litigant in the place of, and jointly with, the subjects of rights 
and obligations for a specific object of litigation.142 The 
                                                
	
	
141 A Reply to Certain Issues Concerning Judging Defamation Cases by 
the Sup. People’s Ct., supra note 63. 
142 SHINDŌ KŌJI: NEW CIVIL LITIGATION LAW 208 (Lin Jianfeng trans., 
China Law Press 2008). 
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validity of judgment undertaken by the third party is 
equivalent to the subject of rights and obligations.143 In the 
case of litigation executive, the plaintiff files the lawsuit in 
this own name, rather than as the owner of substantive 
rights and obligations. This is different from the case of 
litigation agent.144 
Litigation executive theory provides a reasonable 
explanation for the separation of the qualification of 
litigation subject and civil subject. In the posthumous harm 
cases, who will be the qualified plaintiff? Following the ideas 
of the previous text, I would emphasize my findings as 
follows: Firstly, in the case of converted interests, the close 
relatives whose intrinsic interests are violated enjoy the 
substantive right of claim. The problem of plaintiff 
qualification can be properly resolved in light of this.145 
Secondly, in the case of extended interests, the intrinsic 
interests of the close relatives themselves are not violated, so 
they enjoy only litigation rights but no substantive rights. 
That is, the close relatives are only litigation executives. 
Thirdly, in the case where body interests are violated, bodily 
integrity is actually an extended interest. Thus, the range of 
the plaintiff should be confined to the close relatives of 
litigation executives. But in grave-related disputes, the 
accused violates the interests of the whole family as a 
community. The plaintiff files the lawsuit as the person who 




144 Litigation executive consists of a legal litigation executive and an 
arbitrary litigation executive. The law grants the right of the former, 
while the right of the latter comes from the will. Id. 
145 It should be noted that the intrinsic interests of the close relatives are 
violated only under legal fiction. In Anonymous Case, it was improper for 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs to file the lawsuit in the absence of close 
relatives. The ruling of the court conformed to legal principles. Id. 
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holds substantive rights. In China's judicial practice, the 
interests of the deceased’s family are compensated in the 
form of spiritual harm compensation.146 The plaintiff ranges 
from the partner and close relatives of the deceased, to the 
deceased’s offspring.147 I endorse this opinion. 
Another question is, since the close relatives enjoy the 
litigation right as the legal litigation executive, can the 
litigation right be conferred to any person according to the 
will of the deceased during his life? If the litigation executive 
is designated by the deceased during his life, then what will 
be the validity of the litigation right? I believe that in 
posthumous harm cases, the designated litigation executive 
is not only valid, but enjoys higher priority than legal 
litigation executive. The fundamental reason is that the 
designated litigation executive conforms with the objective 
of autonomy of the will. The ante-mortem act of 
authorization should be fully respected. According to Article 
82 of the Supreme People's Court Opinions on Several Issues 
of Implementation of General Principles of the Civil Law of 
                                                
	
	
146 See Jun, supra note 127, at 10-11. 
147 For typical cases, see [lawsuit brought by Zeng Haisheng and Zen 
Kuang against the village committee of Sitang Village, Qianchang Town, 
Jingshan County for personal injury and compensation claim] (No. 47 
judgment of first instance by Jingshan County People's Court 2007); 
[lawsuit brought by Xiao Wuqiu and Xiao Zhouqiu against Yan Yuewen 
for violation of reputation right] (No. 121 judgment of first instance by 
Chaling County People's Court 2009); [lawsuit brought by Wang 
Shunpu, Wang Shunhua and Wang Shunpin against Xu Mingwu and 
Chen Changfu for right violation and compensation claim] (No. 32 
judgment of first instance by Anxiang County People's Court 2000); 
[lawsuit brought by Liu Jinxiang, Liu Jiehuang, Liu Guojian and Liu 
Er'feng against Wei Jinbin, Xie Zaisheng and Cao Renzhen for violation 
of property right and compensation claim] (No. 183 judgment of first 
instance by Xunwu County People's Court 2008). 
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the People's Republic of China (Trial), the agency behavior 
of the agent that already takes place before the death of the 
principal and continues after death for the benefit of the 
inheritors of the principal is deemed as valid.148 If the 
substantive rights conferred by the principal are still valid 
after the death of principal, the authorized litigation rights 
should be valid as well. 
 
D. PROTECTION TERM 
 
The well-known case of "Defaming Han Yu” has 
aroused the controversy of a protection term in posthumous 
harm.149 In this case, Guo wrote an article suggesting that 
Han Yu, the man of letters in Tang Dynasty, died of venereal 
disease.150 Han Sidao, the 39th generation of Han Yu, sued 
Guo for defaming the deceased according to the criminal law 
of Taiwan and won.151 The question is: Should there be a 
protection term of interests of the deceased in posthumous 
harm cases?152 China's existing laws contain no written 
regulations on this, except the protection term of the 
                                                
	
	
148 In case a principal is in any of the following circumstances after death, 
the acts performed by the agent he entrusted shall be regarded as 
effective if the agent does not know the principal has died. See 最高人民
法院关于贯彻执行《中华人民共和国民法通则》若干问题的意见(试行) 
[Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues concerning 
the Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the 
People's Republic of China (For Trial Implementation)] (deliberated and 
adopted at the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court on 
January 26, 1988). 
149 See YANG RENSHOU, FAXUE FANGFA LUN [METHODOLOGY OF LAW] 3 
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copyright of the deceased.153 Looking at the legislative 
examples from the perspective of comparative law, we can 
find two forms of protection: definite term and uncertain 
term. For example, the statutory laws of various states in the 
U.S. generally specify the protection in definite terms.154 The 
protection term of the interests of the deceased ranges from 
10 to 100 years. German civil law adopts the protection with 
an uncertain term.155 It is only specified that the term of 
validity of copyright is 70 years after death. However, there 
are no specifications in the protection term of other interests 
of the deceased. I insist that China's civil code in the future 
should adhere to an uncertain protection term for the 
following reasons. 
Firstly, if the interests of the deceased are to be 
protected as legal rights, then there will be no problem 
setting the protection term, since only rights have protection 
terms, not benefits.  
Secondly, if a definite protection term is 
implemented, then the determination of the protection term 
will completely rely on the discretion of the legislators. Thus, 
it will be difficult to explain why the protection term is 50 
years instead of 70 years. If an uncertain protection term is 
adopted, then in the case of extended interests, the length of 
the protection term only depends on the claim of the 
plaintiff. If there is no qualified plaintiff, then the right of 
action is revoked. The legislators do not have to ponder 
upon the appropriate term of protection.  
Thirdly, the time of existence of the interests of the 
deceased is inconsistent. When the common interests of the 
                                                
	
	
153 See Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, at art. 21. 
154 See Smolensky, supra note 131, at 733. 
155 Id. 
190 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 23 
family of the deceased are violated, the duration of the 
interests of the body related to the grave is the longest. 
Moreover, folk customs vary from place to place. The non-
discretionary implementation of the protection term is futile. 
In a few words, posthumous interests are constantly 
declining. When the memory of the deceased has faded and 
the interests of protecting the ante-mortem image of the 
deceased dwindle over time, there will be less need for 
protection. For instance, the manufacturing and selling of 
the golden card printed with the image of Lu Xun, who 
passed away in 1930s, in the name of commemorating a 
modern wise man is an act of posthumous harm.156 
However, the manufacturing and selling of the golden cards 
printed with the image of great poets Li Bai and Du Fu, who 
lived two thousand years ago during the Tang Dynasty, or 
the publication of a postcard printed with the image of Qin 
Shihuang, who was the first Emperor in Chinese history, is 
not an act of posthumous harm.157 
 
E. UNSETTLED ISSUES 
 
The theoretical issues associated with posthumous 
harm are highly complex. These issues are rarely covered by 
law, and remain to be settled. On the microscopic level, how 
can the private law relief be bridged with the public law 
relief in posthumous harm cases? On the macroscopic level, 
how can legal fiction be paired with legal tools to prevent it 
                                                
	
	
156 See [Lawsuit brought by Zhou Haiying against Shaoxing Yuewang 
Jewelry and Gold Company for violation of the portrait right of Lu Xun’] 
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Qingshi Yu Dafu Minshi Juan [Instructions Asked 
from the Supreme Peoples Law and Reply (Civil Affairs)] China Law 
Press 92-93 (2004). 
157 Id. 
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from degrading into pure reasoning? This question is 
important to prevent the legislature from creating something 
out of nothing. As the interests prior to death are extended, 
will the ‘worldliness feature’ of civil law only have symbolic 
meaning? Or we can ask, is the principle of legal capacity 
really that important? I firmly believe that the reflections 
inspired by posthumous harm cases will bring about a 




Death is an unwelcome but inevitable word. When 
talking about the legal issues related to death, we need to 
have not only the wisdom of life, but also moral courage. 
Traditional civil law only concerns the living and 
posthumous harm is usually selectively ignored by jurists. 
What the private law can do is no more than preventing the 
name of the deceased from being trampled on, preventing 
the body from being treated as property by others, and 
providing a decent funeral. However, posthumous harm is 
not as simple as holding a funeral. The ante-mortem 
behaviors of the deceased are, after all, an objective 
existence. Thus, various vested interests arising from it have 
to be taken into the legal domain. In modern society, when 
we put philosophical disputes aside, respecting the deceased 
is no longer a vague moral claim, but a legal norm that needs 
to be obeyed by the living. 
In Chinese traditional culture, it is believed that what 
one has done during his life can be freely discussed by the 
later generations. Mocking the ancient people has already 
become a heated cultural phenomenon. Civil law only 
provides limited relief to posthumous harm and it will 
dampen the enthusiasm of the modern people in their 
commentary on the ancient people. Generally speaking, 
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posthumous relief is not to engage the deceased in tacky 
calculation of cost and profit, but to provide a reasonable 
expectation about the unknown world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
